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PUTTING A FACE TO A (SCREEN) NAME: THE
FIRST AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS OF
COMPELLING ISPS TO REVEAL THE
IDENTITIES OF ANONYMOUS INTERNET
SPEAKERS IN ONLINE DEFAMATION CASES
Jennifer O'Brien*
INTRODUCTION
"[A]nonymity is an essential tool in protecting free speech and
action on the Internet, even if accountability is marginally
diminished."1
For many, the ideology underlying the First Amendment and the
protection it affords the freedom to speak anonymously are sacrosanct
aspects of American jurisprudence. In recent years, however,
fundamental questions underlying the proper treatment of online
defamation have placed established First Amendment principles in
uncharted territory. Although common law courts have addressed
defamation in a variety of contexts for centuries,2 the rise of the
Internet has forced judges to grapple with novel legal arguments and
design innovative remedies suited to this new medium.
The ability of Internet users to remain anonymous by using "screen
names" or other imaginary identities to identify themselves online has
created a significant issue within the field of defamation. Although
the anonymous user may have submitted his true identity to an
Internet Service Provider ("ISP") 3 when he signed up for its service,
by using a screen name he is able to create an entirely new persona for
* J.D. Candidate, 2003, Fordham University School of Law. This is dedicated to my
mom and Kristen, my two best friends and the strongest people I know, and to the
memory of my father, who I know is still looking out for me. I would also like to
thank Professor Andrew Sims, whose class provided the idea for this Note.
1. Shawn C. Helms, Translating Privacy Values with Technology, 7 B.U. J. Sci. &
Tech. L. 288,304-05 (2001).
2. See Victor E. Schwartz et al., Prosser, Wade and Schwartz's Torts 833 (10th
ed. 2000) (chronicling the process through which the common law courts obtained
jurisdiction over the torts of libel and slander, which compose defamation, during the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries).
3. See Madeleine Schachter, Law of Internet Speech 522 (2001) (defining an ISP




his Internet communications, based on the distinction that "[u]nlike
real space, cyberspace reveals no self-authenticating facts about
identity. 4
In recent years, an increasing number of suits have been filed by
plaintiffs who claim to have been defamed by anonymous "postings"
in online chat rooms, bulletin board systems, or other message
centers. Unlike the plaintiffs in most traditional defamation claims
however, these plaintiffs are unable to name their defamers, since
only the screen names of the posters are ascertainable. In an effort to
determine the true identities of potential defendants, plaintiffs have
begun to serve subpoenas on the ISPs that host the anonymous
defamers or the message boards on which the communications have
been posted to compel them to reveal the identity of the anonymous
users.6 To determine whether the ISP should have to reveal the user's
identity, courts have been forced to balance the plaintiffs interest in
pursuing a defamation claim against the First Amendment rights of
anonymous speakers.
In many instances the motivation for these online suits parallels
those in traditional defamation cases, with plaintiffs attempting to
redress the perceived harm to their reputation that the defamation has
generated.7 In some cases, however, the plaintiff may be more
interested in simply unmasking the identity of the anonymous speaker
than in obtaining a judicial remedy. As an example, assume that Al, a
disgruntled employee of a retail manufacturer, decides to take out his
job frustrations on a popular online message board under the moniker
4. Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace 33 (1999) (maintaining
that the regulability of cyberspace is "profoundly impacted" by the different way in
which identity is constructed in real versus cyberspace). Whereas "real space"
demands that you reveal "your sex, your age, how you look, what language you speak,
whether you can see, whether you can hear, [and] how intelligent you are,"
cyberspace requires that "you reveal only an [IP] address." Id.
5. See Schachter, supra note 3, at 518 (defining a bulletin board system as "a
computer-based message center that allows users to access it remotely and to post
messages to be accessed by other users"). In large part, defamation litigation has
arisen from allegedly defamatory Internet communications posted on bulletin boards,
chat rooms, or other online message centers. Bulletin boards, which have been
characterized as "the forum in which society [now] conducts its debates on a variety
of matters," allow users to read and respond to online messages on a myriad of topics,
and have been characterized as a "frontier" medium of communication in which users
feel comfortable communicating openly as a result of their ability to remain
anonymous or pseudoanonymous. Jeremy Stone Weber, Note, Defining Cyberlibeh
A First Amendment Limit for Libel Suits Against Individuals Arising from Computer
Bulletin Board Speech, 46 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 235, 239-41 (1995).
6. See Julie Hilden, Why Anonymous Internet Speakers Can't Count on ISPs to
Protect Them, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hilden/20010101.htmi (Jan. 1, 2001)
("[I]f the target of anonymous, damaging Internet speech wants to seek out the
speaker, the ISP is still the entity to which he must direct his subpoena. After all, he
can't serve a subpoena on a person he can't even identify.").
7. Id. (discussing the motivation behind traditional defamation suits and those
brought against anonymous online posters).
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"MadAl." Within his posting, MadAl accuses the managers of his
company of incompetence, as well as the embezzlement of corporate
funds. Two weeks later, his managers, in an attempt to determine the
identity of the anonymous poster, bring an action for defamation.
Unable to serve a subpoena on the anonymous Internet user himself,
the company serves the ISP that provides MadAl with his Internet
connection, demanding that the company divulge his true identity.
Although the plaintiffs are aware that the anonymous poster may not
possess the financial resources to make pursuit of a defamation suit
worthwhile in a monetary sense, they nonetheless hope that the
information they garner from the ISP will help them to enact an extra-
judicial remedy, whether it be through the employee's dismissal, the
demand of his resignation, or private threats to make the postings
cease. If the subpoena is challenged, the court will be faced wvith the
question of whether the plaintiffs should be allowed to learn the true
identity of MadAl, an issue that has plagued a number of state courts
in recent years and for which no definitive guidelines have been
established.
As the publicity surrounding the efforts of online defamation
plaintiffs to reveal the true identities of anonymous posters has
increased, free speech advocates have been adamant in their view
that demanding such compelled disclosure is a violation of the
anonymous speaker's free speech rights,9 and that avoiding such First
Amendment transgressions must take precedence as courts struggle to
establish principles that will govern their decisions in such cases.
This Note explores the competing concerns that courts must
consider when an ISP is subpoenaed to disclose the identity of an
anonymous speaker: protection of the speaker's First Amendment
fights versus recognition of the plaintiffs interest in redressing online
defamation.
Part I provides background information on the Internet as a
burgeoning medium of communication."0 Part I also outlines the First
Amendment concerns implicated in defamation claims, as well as the
way defamation has evolved within the context of the Internet."
Finally, Part I discusses the historical underpinnings for the protection
& See, eg., Laura Randall, Web Anonymity Suits Face Obstacles, Newsbytes, at
http:lexn.ca/Stories/1999107/26/04.asp (July 26, 1999) (characterizing anonymous
postings as an issue "dominating the burgeoning field of Internet law," and discussing
the media attention granted to releases issued by companies suing anonymous
posters).
9. Nadine Strossen, Protecting Privacy and Free Speech in Cyberspace, 89 Geo.
L.J. 2103, 2106-07 (2001) (discussing recent efforts of the American Civil Liberties
Union to ensure protection for anonymous and pseudoanonymous communications
under the First Amendment).
10. See infra Part I.A.
11. See infra Part I.B.
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of anonymous speech, and its salience in ensuring the continuing
popularity of the Internet as a medium of communication. 12
Part II outlines the legal controversy surrounding the disclosure of
the identities of anonymous speakers by ISPs in online defamation
actions, and the competing arguments that have been advanced to
govern the adjudication of such claims.
Part III argues that the guidelines adopted by the New Jersey
Appellate Division in Dendrite International, Inc. v. Doe, No. 313
should be uniformly employed by courts dealing with the issue of
compelled disclosure by ISPs. In analyzing each step of the Dendrite
test as it applies to online defamation, this part also contends it is
imperative that the unique characteristics of the Internet be taken into
account in evaluating whether each element of a defamation claim has
been established.
I. THE INTERNET AS AN AVENUE FOR ANONYMOUS DEFAMATION
A. The Evolution of the Internet
With the advent of the Internet, society has witnessed an
extraordinary revolution in the means through which people interact.
Those assessing the Internet's impact upon modern communication
have found it to embody "a world-wide broadcasting capability, a
mechanism for information dissemination, and a medium for
collaboration and interaction between individuals and their computers
without regard for geographic location."' 4 With the development of
the World Wide Web ("Web")15 and the proliferation of individual
Web pages, 6 it is now possible for anyone with a computer and an
Internet connection to retrieve a staggering array of information,
7
twenty-four hours a day, at minimal or no cost.
18
As the technological underpinnings of the Internet have
expanded, 19 the number of people utilizing its seemingly boundless
12. See infra Part I.C.
13. 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
14. Barry M. Leiner et al., A Brief History of the Internet, at http://www.isoc.org/
internet/historylbrief.shtml#Introduction (last modified Aug. 4,2000).
15. See Schachter, supra note 3, at 9 (characterizing the Web as "a massive
collection of digital information resources stored on servers throughout the
Internet").
16. See id. (describing Web pages as hypertext documents that "may incorporate
various combinations of text, graphics, audio and video content, software programs,
and other data" and defining a Web site as a compilation of individual Web pages).
17. See id. at 6 (reporting that the quantity of information available to online users
has increased to an aggregate of over one billion discrete pages as of 2000).
18. G. Gervaise Davis III, Internet Domain Names and Trademarks: Recent
Developments in Domestic and International Disputes, 21 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J.
601, 606 (1999).
19. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997) ("The number of 'host' computers-
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ability to establish links of communication has likewise multiplied.
According to a press release published by the United States Internet
Council in November 2001, there are currently over a half-billion
Internet users worldwide,20 a figure that is surprisingly high in light of
earlier estimates projecting future Internet use.1 As this pattern of
increased use continues, commentators are optimistic that
technological advancements will enable the Internet to evolve to meet
the stringent demands of an increasingly high-tech society.'
Although the Internet has gained notoriety as an instrument of
global information dissemination, it has faced a concomitant number
of ideological and pragmatic challenges as society has struggled to find
a means of understanding and regulating its scope as an
unprecedented technological advancement. Within the legal field, the
Internet has led to disputes over subjects as varied as online copyright
infringement~l and the privacy implications of using "cookies"2 in
compiling profiles of Internet users.2- The resolution of such issues
often engages both courts and legislatures in a complex struggle to
comport longstanding "real world" legal remedies with the unique
characteristics of the amorphous digital expanse known as
"cyberspace." In recent years, online defamation has emerged as a
those that store information and relay communications-increased from about 300 in
1981 to approximately 9,400,000... in 1996.").
20. Press Release, United States Internet Council, United States Internet Council
Releases Third Annual Survey of Net Trends (Nov. 12, 2001), at http./Iwww.usic.org/
pressreleases/l11201.htm.
21. Reno, 521 U.S. at 850 (reporting that the Internet has experienced
"'extraordinary growth"' in that "[albout 40 million people used the Internet [in
1997], a number that is expected to mushroom to 200 million by 1999").
22. See Leiner et al., supra note 14. It is predicted that the continuing evolution
of the Internet:
will bring us new applications-Internet telephone and, slightly further out,
Internet television. It is evolving to permit more sophisticated forms of
pricing and cost recovery.... It is changing to accommodate yet another
generation of underlying network technologies with different characteristics
and requirements, from broadband residential access to satellites. New
modes of access and new forms of service will spawn new applications, which
in turn will drive further evolution of the net itself.
Id.
23. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
24. See Schachter, supra note 3, at 518 (defining a cookie as "client-side persistent
information that allows Web servers to have the Web browser store information
about a user's browsing habits, such as which [Web sites] the user previously visited").
25. See In re Doubleclick Inc. Privacy Litigation, 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
26. See Schachter, supra note 3, at 519 (defining cyberspace as a "digital world
constructed by computers, such as the Internet, a decentralized, global medium of
communication that links people, institutions, corporations, and governments around
the world"). It has been noted that many of the challenges to regulating cyberspace
have resulted from the fact that "the provision of online services resists traditional
centralized methods of legal regulation." Keith Siver, Good Samaritans in
Cyberspace, 23 Rutgers Computer & Tech. LJ. 1. 8 (1997). Courts have struggled in
analogizing the services provided by ISPs to more traditional communications
2002] 2749
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particularly challenging area of law, forcing courts to decide how the
doctrine underlying traditional defamation jurisprudence should be
applied to Internet communications. z7 The following section outlines
the tort of defamation, focusing on both the First Amendment
concerns implicated in analyzing defamatory communications and the
manner in which defamation has evolved within the context of the
Internet.
B. The Tort of Defamation
The tort of defamation is generally defined as a false
communication that tends to tarnish a plaintiff's reputation.28
Common law courts have grappled with defamatory communications
for hundreds of years, 9 as judges have sought to strike a balance
between a plaintiffs interest in seeking redress for a reputational
injury and a defendant's right to free speech.3 0  Although the law
governing defamation has long been characterized as "twisted, or
wrenched sadly out of shape by its historical development,' 31 the rise
of the Internet has only served to further cloud the already murky
waters of defamation jurisprudence.
1. Defamation and the First Amendment
The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides a basic list of the
elements that define defamation. According to the Restatement,
defamation requires "a false and defamatory statement concerning
another; an unprivileged publication to a third party; fault amounting
at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and either
technology. Id. at 4.
27. See Bruce W. Sanford & Michael J. Lorenger, Teaching An Old Dog New
Tricks: The First Amendment In An Online World, 28 Conn. L. Rev. 1137, 1154
(1996) (acknowledging that the manner in which "current laws regulating defamation
and protecting core First Amendment values will be applied -or should be applied -
to cyberlibel is yet unknown").
28. See Schwartz et al., supra note 2, at 838; Schachter, supra note 3, at 193.
29. See Schwartz et al., supra note 2, at 833-34.
30. See Robert M. Ackerman, Bringing Coherence to Defamation Law Through
Uniform Legislation: The Search for an Elegant Sohtion, 72 N.C. L. Rev. 291, 293
(1994) (stating that aside from being confusing and unclear, the law of defamation
"fails to serve its most important objectives: providing an adequate remedy for
reputational harm while allowing sufficient protection for speech," primarily because
it must incorporate both Supreme Court First Amendment jurisprudence and an
"archaic" body of common law arising from "medieval roots").
31. Schwartz et al., supra note 2, at 833; see also Rodney A. Smolla, Dun &
Bradstreet, Hepps, and Liberty Lobby: A New Analytic Primer on the Future Course
of Defamation, 75 Geo. L.J. 1519, 1519 (1987) ("From its inception, the law of
defamation has been singularly bent on establishing its reputation for quirky
terminology and byzantine doctrine.").
2750 [Vol. 70
2002] PUTTING A FACE TO A (SCREEN) NAME
actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the
existence of special harm caused by the publication." -
In addition to the guidelines posited by the Restatement, the
boundaries of the tort of defamation have been constrained by a
speaker's free speech rights under the First Amendment. 3 Although
commentators have noted that the Supreme Court has demonstrated
an "apparent lack of any coherent consensus" on exactly how the First
Amendment should be applied to the standards governing
defamation,' the Court has recognized that "[t]he general proposition
that freedom of expression upon public questions is secured by the
First Amendment has long been settled by [the Court's] decisions.
The constitutional safeguard... 'was fashioned to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people."'35 The Court has also recognized that
this freedom must extend beyond the protection of solely political
speech, in that "'[f]reedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic
function in this nation, must embrace all issues about which
information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of
society to cope with the exigencies of their period."''" Therefore, the
Court has declared that libel, like other forms of "repression of
expression" that have been challenged, "can claim no talismanic
immunity from constitutional limitations," and will be judged "by
standards that satisfy the First Amendment."37
Contemporary courts have struggled, however, with the formidable
task of introducing the First Amendment into their analysis of libelous
communications in an effort to deter false or defamatory speech while
enabling "free speech to flourish and public debate to rage
unfettered."'
32. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558 (1977).
33. See Susan Freiwald, Comparative Institutional Analysis in Cyberspace: The
Case of Intermediary Liability for Defamation, 14 Harv. J.L & Tech. 569, 583 (2001)
("In recognition of the risks to non-defamatory speech posed by defamation liability,
the Supreme Court has erected First Amendment based hurdles to defamation
claims.").
34. Smolla, supra note 31, at 1521; see also Arlen W. Langvardt, Media
Defendants, Public Concerns, and Public Plaintiffs: Toward Fashioning Order From
Confusion in Defamation Law, 49 U. Pitt. L Rev. 91, 92 (1987) (discussing the
difficulties encountered by the Supreme Court in balancing the divergent interests in
defamation cases).
35. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (quoting Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
36. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967) (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88, 102 (1940)).
37. N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 269.
38. Jonathan Garret Erwin, Note, Can Deterrence Play a Positive Role in
Defamation Law?, 19 Rev. Litig. 675, 676 (2000) (stating that finding a balance
between the two goals of "deter[ing] the citizenry, including the press, from
communicating all unprivileged, false, defamatory speech" and protecting freedom of
speech is the essential aim of defamation jurisprudence).
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In a speech before the Georgia Bar Media & Judiciary Conference,
the Honorable Abner J. Mikva discussed the difficulties that courts
have encountered in attempting to incorporate First Amendment
rights into defamation litigation within the context of statements of
opinion.39 Although at one point most lower courts embraced the
idea that all statements of opinion were not defamatory and were
protected by the First Amendment, Judge Mikva recognized the
struggle that many courts nonetheless faced in applying a fact/opinion
distinction.' In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.." the Supreme Court
refuted the notion that all expressions of opinion are non-defamatory.
The Court held that a First Amendment privilege extends only to
statements of opinion that do not "imply a false assertion of fact,"4
either because they "cannot 'reasonably [be] interpreted as stating
actual facts' about an individual,"4 3 or because they are provably
false.' Satire, parody, hyperbole, and invective have all been found to
fall within the second category.45 Lower courts, however, have still
failed to adopt a uniform means of adjudicating opinion cases. 6
The fact/opinion dichotomy represents only one of a myriad of
challenges facing courts applying the First Amendment in defamation
cases. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,47 the Supreme Court's
seminal defamation decision, the Court held that the level of fault a
defendant must possess in a defamation suit varies with the status of
the plaintiff. In holding that a defendant accused of defaming a
plaintiff found to be a "public figure"48 must be held to an "actual
malice" level of fault, the Court reasoned that public figures have
greater access to media outlets to counteract reputational damage,
and that by assuming public status they have "voluntarily exposed
themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood."49
This doctrine was later extended by the Court to reach a "private"
plaintiff bringing an action for defamation about a matter of "public
concern." Under Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,50 such a plaintiff would
39. Abner J. Mikva, In My Opinion, Those Are Not Facts, Address at the Georgia
Bar Media & Judiciary Conference (Oct. 15, 1994), in 11 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 291
(1995).
40. Id. at 298.
41. 497 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1990).
42. Id. at 19.
43. Id. at 20 (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46,50 (1988)).
44. Id.
45. See id.
46. Kathryn Dix Sowle, A Matter of Opinion: Milkovich Four Years Later, 3 Win.
& Mary Bill Rts. J. 467, 498-99 (1994) (using eight categories to classify the different
decisions of lower courts in opinion cases).
47. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
48. Black's Law Dictionary defines a public figure as "[a] person who has
achieved fame or notoriety or who has voluntarily become involved in a public
controversy." Black's Law Dictionary 1243 (7th ed. 1999).
49. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1974).
50. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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still need to prove at least negligence on the part of the defendant in
order to collect damages, and "actual malice" to collect damages for
anything other than "actual injury. '51  Lower courts, however, in
interpreting the public/private concern dichotomy of defamatory
statements outlined by the Supreme Court, have failed to establish "a
useful methodology" for adjudicating such cases, instead relying upon
"ad hoc analyses" or "ipse dixit conclusions."'
"
2. Defamation Within the Context of the Internet
Not surprisingly, the expansion of the Internet has done little to
alleviate the burden of judges in defamation cases, as "[y]esterday's
vast, unlitigated frontier of computer-aided communication is quickly
becoming today and tomorrow's legal battleground.""3  In
adjudicating claims involving Internet defamation, courts have been
confronted with an entirely uncharted assortment of arguments for
how such claims should be handled.' Although it has been noted that
"cyberlibel" developed under the same principles that govern
traditional defamation cases, courts handling online claims have been
forced to "adapt traditional print media applications to the electronic
world."55 In some instances, these challenges have led the court to
build upon the principles of traditional defamation adjudication.
In applying the fact/opinion dichotomy in cyberspace, many
commentators have argued that the question implicates an even
greater concern, as online users often attempt to protect their
anonymity in defamation suits by claiming their expressions are
51. Id. at 349.
52. Nat Stem, Private Concerns of Private Plaintiffs: Revisiting a Problematic
Defamation Category, 65 Mo. L. Rev. 597,598 (2000).
53. Weber, supra note 5, at 235.
54. In a speech given before the Computer Law Association, Robert M. O'Neil,
Director of the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression,
highlighted a number of the unique issues facing courts in online cases, including how
to determine jurisdiction over a "purely electronic visitor," the guidelines to cover
who is a "publisher" on the Internet, the extent to which the privilege of fair comment
can be applied to online libel, how retractions of allegedly defamatory statements
should be handled in cyberspace, and the overall modifications of defamationjurisprudence that are mandated by the "nature of the medium." Robert M. O'Neil,
The Drudge Case: A Look at Issues in Cyberspace Defamation, Speech Before the
Computer Law Association (Feb. 12, 1998), in 73 Wash. L. Rev. 623, 624 (1998).
55. Barry J. Waldman, A Unified Approach to Cyber-Libel: Defamation on the
Interne4 A Suggested Approach, 6 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 9, 34 (1999), at
http://www.richmond.edu/jolt/v6i2/notel.html. Over the last few years, Internet
bulletin boards have also given rise to a distinctive brand of defamation known as
"cybersmears," in which anonymous users post false or disparaging messages
pertaining to a business or its highest executives on an Internet message center. John
A. Walker, Cybersmears, Cyberspace Law., July/Aug. 2001, at 10 n.1. It is estimated
that American companies have filed over 150 cybersmear lawsuits since 1998 against
"John or Jane Does" in an attempt to reveal the true identity of the anonymous
Internet posters. Id. at 10.
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opinions protected by the First Amendment. In arguing that courts
must "resolve as a matter of law. .. whether [d]efendants' statements
are constitutionally privileged statements of opinion without requiring
disclosure of the identities of the [d]efendants, 5 6 these commentators
have outlined a number of factors unique to the Internet that must be
factored into classifying a defamatory statement as opinion." These
commentators recognize that many statements that may appear
factual when taken out of context are really "merely hyperbole,
speculation, or invective."58  Critics have argued that many of the
allegedly defamatory statements on message boards are not implying
assertions of objective facts, and that courts therefore should "extend
the benefit of the constitutional opinion privilege to many (though by
no means all) of the defendants in the new Internet libel cases."59
Commentators have also tackled the way New York Times and its
progeny should apply in the Internet context, arguing that most
Internet defendants should be held to a standard of actual malice, as
all defamation plaintiffs who engage in online discourse are public
figures.' Critics have also advanced a number of arguments as to why
corporations, easy targets for Internet attacks, may correctly be
viewed as public figures. In most instances, "corporations have an
interest in convincing the public of their financial well-being," and
publicly held corporations often proactively "go public" in an effort to
raise money from investors, thus "seek[ing] and often obtain[ing]
national attention."'61 Even if a plaintiff is not considered a public
figure under the New York Times standard, the doctrine set forth in
Gertz can often be applied to show that the anonymous statements
pertained to a matter of public concern, thus the doctrine still triggers
a higher standard of fault. For some commentators, the unique
56. Brief of Amici Curiae ACLU & ACLU of Florida at 12, Hvide v. Does, No.
99-22831 CA 01 (Fla. Cir. Ct. complaint filed Sept. 29, 1999) [hereinafter ACLU
Brief].
57. The ACLU has argued that it is "easy" to see how many of the statements
giving rise to cybersmear allegations on financial bulletin boards could be classified as
opinion. Id. at 12. The ACLU, citing Biospherics, Inc. v. Forbes, Inc., 151 F.3d 180,
184 (4th Cir. 1998), argued that the "inherently speculative nature of 'investment
advice"' has been acknowledged even when the advice is being dispensed by trained
analysts. Id. Within the context of Internet financial message boards, it is even more
likely that such message boards will be filled with "emotional rants" whenever a stock
price begins to drop. Id.
58. Id.
59. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in
Cyberspace, 49 Duke L.J. 855, 932-33 (2000).
60. Critics have advanced this argument by claiming that all plaintiffs have
immediate access to a means of counteracting the defamatory statements, and that by
actively participating in the message boards or chat rooms where the allegedly
defamatory statements appeared they have "thrust themselves into a situation where
they invite public scrutiny." Weber, supra note 5, at 237.
61. Lidksy, supra note 59, at 911.
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attributes of Internet discourse also call for an expansion of the
traditional definition of what constitutes a matter of public concern.6 2
In most early online defamation cases, plaintiffs, to avoid the legal
struggles of determining the identity of an anonymous poster or to
seek the "deep pockets" of a corporation, would bring an action for
defamation against the ISP that hosted the alleged defamer or the
board where the messages were posted, rather than the anonymous
user. In Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services, Co.,' a New York
state court upheld this practice, finding that Prodigy,' an ISP that
claimed to exercise editorial control over the content of its bulletin
boards, could be held liable as a "publisher" of allegedly defamatory
statements posted anonymously on its "Money Talk" board. 5
Although recognizing that Internet bulletin boards should generally
be placed in the same category as bookstores or libraries, and held to
the lower "knowledge" standard of liability as mere "distributors" of
information,' the court found that Prodigy's policy of exercising
editorial control over its bulletin boards and the technology it had
implemented to effectuate this control opened it up to greater
liability.
67
The decision in Stratton eventually became the subject of
Congressional scrutiny, leading to passage of the bill eventually
implemented as the Communications Decency Act ("CDA"). The
debates on the CDA recognized the "enormous burden" that would
be placed on ISPs if they were to be held accountable for the content
posted on their sites by third parties.69  In the CDA, Congress
62- See id. at 912-15 ("The powerful democratizing effect of the boards gives
corporations a reason to fear them, but it also justifies treating discourse on the board
as involving a matter of public concern."); see also Roundtable, First Amendinent on
Trial-The Libel Lawyer's Perspective, 23 Seattle U. L. Rev. 849, 879 (2000)
[hereinafter Roundtable, First Amendment] (restating attorney John Shaeffer's
argument that "[f]rom a more practical perspective, the way I see the law evolving
is-and this is my own personal opinion-is that everything has become an issue of
public concern. I can't think of anything right now that isn't an issue of public
concern").
63. No. 31063/94, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229 (Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
64. The court found that Prodigy's computer network had over two million
subscribers who communicated over Prodigy's bulletin boards. Id. at *3.
65. The court found that "Money Talk," on which members could post messages
pertaining to stocks and other financial information, was the most popular financial
computer bulletin board within the United States. See id.
66. It has been held that "[a] vendor or distributor of a newspaper, magazine or
book is called a 'secondary publisher' and is not liable if he had no knowledge of
libelous matter in the publication and had no reason to be put on guard." Schwartz et
al., supra note 2, at 866.
67. Stratton, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229, at *12-13.
68. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)-(h) (Supp. 1996).
69. See Schachter, supra note 3, at 203 (citing 141 Cong. Rec. H8460-01, H84-1
(daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Mr. Goodlatte) ("There is no way [these]
entities ... can take the responsibility to edit out information that is going to be
coming in to them from all manner of sources.... [This] is going to be thousands of
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concluded that ISPs should not be held to publisher liability,
regardless of whether they had exercised editorial control over the
contents of their site. The Act provides that "[n]o provider or user of
an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider."7"
Since the passage of the CDA, federal courts have resolutely
shielded ISPs from liability for the allegedly defamatory postings of
third parties in a diverse number of situations.71 In Zeran v. America
Online, Inc.,72 Zeran brought an action against America Online, Inc.
("AOL"), claiming that the ISP unreasonably delayed in removing
anonymous defamatory statements about Zeran from one of its
bulletin boards, refused to post a retraction of the statements, and
failed to monitor its message boards for similar defamatory messages
thereafter.7 3 In deciding the case, the court recognized the CDA as the
manifestation of Congress's intent to avoid the "chilling effect" on
speech that would result if ISPs were to restrict the number and type
of messages posted on their bulletin boards in an effort to avoid
liability.74 The court also took a broad view of the actions of ISPs that
Congress sought to protect. In finding that AOL assumed the role of
a publisher under its traditional definition,7 5 the court rejected Zeran's
argument that because AOL had acted as a mere conduit of
information with knowledge of its defamatory import it should instead
be held to a lower standard of liability as a distributor of information,
similar to a traditional news vendor.76 The court stated that even if
Zeran had established that AOL was only a distributor, "this theory
of liability is merely a subset, or species, of publisher liability, and is
therefore also foreclosed by § 230."77 The court also rejected the idea
that ISPs should be subjected to notice-based liability for defamatory
messages posted on their boards, fearing that such liability would
dissuade ISPs from policing their boards in order to shield themselves
from notice of possible defamatory material, and that the vast amount
pages of information every day, and to have that imposition imposed on them is
wrong.").
70. § 230(c)(1). Section 230 defines an "interactive computer service" as "any
information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables
computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a
service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or
services offered by libraries or educational institutions." § 230(f)(2).
71. Christopher Butler, Note, Plotting the Return of an Ancient Tort to
Cyberspace: Towards a New Federal Standard of Responsibility for Defamation for
Internet Service Providers, 6 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 247, 248 (2000).
72. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998).
73. See id. at 328-29.
74. See id. at 331.
75. Id. at 332.
76. See id. at 331-32; see supra note 60.
77. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332.
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of information communicated through online message boards would
cause ISPs to be "faced with ceaseless choices of suppressing
controversial speech or sustaining prohibitive liability."78
In Blumenthal v. Drudge,79 online "gossip reporter" Matt Drudge
included in his "Drudge Report" the accusation that Sidney
Blumenthal, a White House aide and former journalist, had a history
of abusing his wife. After Blumenthal complained about the item
Drudge removed it, but Blumenthal and his wife brought an action for
defamation against both Drudge and AOL, which hosted the Drudge
Report.g° The court reluctantly held the CDA to be applicable even
though AOL, instead of merely maintaining the bulletin board where
a third party posted allegedly defamatory content, had played "an
active, even aggressive role in making available content prepared by
others"81 by hiring Drudge and paying him for the content he
provided. The court found that in a "tacit quid pro quo arrangement"
Congress had relieved ISPs from liability in an attempt to increase
self-regulation of the material posted on their sites, and that this
immunity would be extended to AOL in spite of the fact that it "has
the fight [sic] to exercise editorial control over those with whom it
contracts and whose words it disseminates, [and] it would seem only
fair to hold AOL to the liability standards applied to a publisher or, at
least.., to the liability standards applied to a distributor."'
Although the CDA has come under fire by commentators
uncomfortable with the idea that the extent of immunity provided to
ISPs seemingly leaves plaintiffs in online defamation cases with few
means of redressing their injuries s-I cases such as Zeran and
Blumenthal have established a "strong precedent" for upholding the
CDA and shielding ISPs from immunity for any defamatory
statements posted on their sites, regardless of notice or the exercise of
editorial control.' Often, this immunity leaves plaintiffs with a single
and seemingly untenable option: trying to bring an action against the
anonymous poster."'
78. Id. at 333.
79. 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998).
80. See Marc A. Franklin et al., Mass Media Law 390, 653 (6th ed. 2000).
81. Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 52.
82. Id at 51-52.
83. See David E. Hallett, How to Destroy a Reputation and Get A way with It- The
Communication Decency Act Examined: Do the Policies and Standards Set Out in the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act Provide a Solution for a Person Defamed Online?.
41 IDEA 259, 260-61 (2001) (arguing that Congress should amend the CDA to
include secondary liability sections that would place a duty on ISPs to take action
when given notice of defamatory statements on their sites).




C. Protection of Anonymous Speech
[A]nonymity in cyberspace is not just different in degree from
anonymity in real space. As cyberspace presently is, it gives an
individual a kind of power that doesn't exist in real space. This is not
just the ability to put on a mask; it is the ability to hide absolutely
who one is. It is not just the ability to speak a different, or encoded,
language; it is the ability to speak a language that is (practically)
impossible to crack. Cyberspace is a place that maximizes both
social and individual plasticity, which means it is a place that
determines very little about what others must know about you.86
The freedom of citizens to engage in anonymous speech has
facilitated the attainment of numerous laudable goals within
American society." In Talley v. California,8 the Supreme Court
recognized the valuable role anonymous speech has played in the
"progress of mankind."89  In Talley, the plaintiffs challenged the
constitutionality of a Los Angeles ordinance requiring handbills to
include the name and address of anyone involved in their printing,
writing, compiling, manufacturing, distributing, or sponsoring in an
effort to identify those responsible for false advertising, fraud, or libel.
In holding that the statute was facially void under the Fourteenth
Amendment,' the Court argued that "anonymity has sometimes been
assumed for the most constructive purposes,"9 and recognized that a
blanket requirement of the disclosure of a speaker's identity would
most likely restrict the distribution of information and consequently
the freedom of expression.92
In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,93 a case involving an
Ohio statute that prohibited the distribution of anonymous campaign
literature, the Court further reasoned that anonymity may often
provide "a shield from the tyranny of the majority," 94 and that
anonymity can ensure that a speaker who is personally unpopular will
still be able to disseminate information to readers without it being
rejected solely upon the readers' opinion of its proponent.95
Anonymous speech "thus exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of
86. Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 Emory L.J. 869,
876-77 (1996).
87. See Schachter, supra note 3, at 236-37 (finding that the social values furthered
by anonymous speech include the preserving of a sense of privacy; fostering the
ability to seek information on sensitive or controversial subjects; and encouraging the
speech of those who fear economic retaliation, social ostracism, and reactions against
one's family; the preserving of a sense of privacy.).
88. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
89. Id. at 64-65.
90. Id. at 65.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 64.
93. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
94. Id. at 357.
95. See id. at 342.
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Rights, and of the First Amendment in particular: to protect
unpopular individuals from retaliation-and their ideas from
suppression- at the hand of an intolerant society.""
Although decided within the context of an economic boycott and
campaign literature, respectively, the principles underlying the
decisions in Talley and McIntyre have been applied by a number of
courts confronted with questions pertaining to Internet speech. In
extending First Amendment protection to anonymous speech online,
these courts have been guided by the Supreme Court's decision in
Reno v. ACLU. The Court in Reno stated that there should be "no
basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should
be applied" to Internet speech,97 which has emerged as a valuable
medium of communication.98
In ACLU v. Miller,99 a federal district court enjoined the
enforcement of a Georgia statute that sought to prevent fraud and
deception on the public by making it a crime for "any person...
knowingly to transmit any data through a computer network... if
such data uses any individual name.., to falsely identify the
person. ' ' "° In recognizing that many Internet users "falsely identify"
themselves by communicating anonymously or pseudoanonymously to
avoid speaking openly about "sensitive" topics that may lead to
discrimination and social ostracism,'' the court concluded that the
sweeping language of the statute banning such communications
amounted to a content-based restriction on speech,'0 because "the
identity of the speaker is no different from other components of [a]
document's contents that the author is free to include or exclude." ' ,
The court held that the statute was not drafted with the "precision
necessary for laws regulating speech," in that it was overbroad and
would infringe upon constitutionally protected speech in violation of
the First Amendment. 4 Ann Beeson of the ACLU stated that the
Miller decision ensured that "whatever limits the Supreme Court sets
on Congress's power to regulate the Internet, states are prohibited
from acting to censor online expression," and that the decision sent "a
96. Id. at 357.
97. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844,870 (1997).
98. See id. at 868 (characterizing the Internet as a "vast democratic forum[]").
99. 977 F. Supp. 1228 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
100. Id at 1230.
101. Id. at 1230, 1233.
102- See id at 1232 (citing R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (providing that
such content-based restrictions are presumptively invalid)).
103. Id (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 340-42
(1995)).
104. See id at 1233 ("On its face, the act prohibits such protected speech as the use
of false identification to avoid social ostracism, to prevent discrimination and
harassment, and to protect privacy, as well as the use of trade names or logos in non-
commercial educational speech, news. and commentary-a prohibition with well-
recognized [F]irst [Almendment problems.").
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very important and powerful message to legislators in the other 4[9]
states that they should keep their hands off the Internet.' ' 5
In a more recent decision, a federal district court went even further
in protecting the right of defendants to communicate anonymously
over the Internet. In Doe v. 2TheMart.com, Inc.,106 an anonymous
Internet poster challenged a subpoena brought by 2TheMart.com
("TMRT") to discover the identity of twenty-three anonymous
speakers who had participated in message boards operated by the ISP
InfoSpace. TMRT sought the information as part of an affirmative
defense to prove that "nasty" messages posted on InfoSpace by
anonymous users had contributed to the injuries suffered by plaintiffs
bringing a shareholder derivative class action against TMRT for fraud
on the market.1°7  In acknowledging the Internet as "a truly
democratic forum for communication" that allows for the exchange of
ideas at an unprecedented speed and scale,"8 the court found that
"[t]he right to speak anonymously extends to speech via the
Internet .... The 'ability to speak one's mind' on the Internet 'without
the burden of the other party knowing all the facts about one's
identity can foster open communication and robust debate.""'
Although the anonymous speakers in 2TheMart.com were not parties
to the underlying litigation, the court stressed the need for "a high
threshold""11 to avoid the "significant chilling effect on Internet
communications and thus on basic First Amendment rights""' that
would result if Internet users could be stripped of those rights by a
civil subpoena under the more liberal rules of general civil discovery.
Although many courts have applied First Amendment protection to
anonymous Internet speech, it has nonetheless been acknowledged
that these rights must be balanced against the interests of plaintiffs
seeking redress from anonymous posters who disseminate allegedly
defamatory communications.'12 Part II examines the competing legal
arguments that have evolved as courts are faced with the task of
determining when ISPs should be compelled to reveal the true
identities of anonymous Internet speakers in online defamation cases.
105. Press Release, ACLU Freedom Network, ACLU Wins First-Ever Challenge
to a State Internet Censorship Law in Georgia (June 20, 1997), at http://www.aclu.org/
news/n062097b.html.
106. 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
107. See id. at 1089-90.
108. Id. at 1097.
109. Id. at 1092 (citing Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578
(N.D. Cal. 1999)).
110. Id. at 1097.
111. Id. at 1093.
112. David L. Sobel, The Process that "John Doe" is Due: Addressing the Legal
Challenge to Internet Anonymity, 5 Va. J.L. & Tech. 3, 1 18 (Symposium, 2000), at
http://www.vjolt.net/vol5/symp2000/v5ila3-Sobel.html (arguing that in each case, the
"potentially conflicting interests in free expression and accountability must be
balanced according to the facts and circumstances").
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II. THE ARGUMENTS SURROUNDING COMPELLED DISCLOSURE
The question of free speech on Internet message boards has become
a polarized legal dilemma. On one side, you have the companies
that are the subject of postings: Their PR departments cringe when
they see message boards brimming with false information and
rumors (not to mention coarse language and bad grammar). On the
other side, you see a swath of free speech advocates who view the
boards as virtual street corners where anyone should be able to set
up a podium and anonymously mouth off. 3
As legal scholar Lyrissa Lidsky has noted, if the only ramifications
of the "new" Internet libel suits were to warn Internet users that they
will be held accountable for their communications, they might well
represent an "unalloyed good.""' 4 First Amendment conflicts arise,
however, when defamation laws begin to "overdeter" and result in
prospective speakers engaging "in undue self-censorship to avoid the
negative consequences of speaking."'1 5 As courts have struggled to
establish principles to govern compelling ISP disclosures in online
defamation cases, different views on how to balance the First
Amendment interests of anonymous speakers against the interests of
defamation plaintiffs in judicial redress have resulted in an ill-defined
body of jurisprudence "that remains so unsettled, it seems likely that
courts will continue to experiment with procedural innovations.""'
Although most courts agree that the First Amendment does not serve
as a complete bar to the disclosure of the identities of anonymous
posters, a definitive method for determining when such disclosure
should be compelled has yet to emerge."' This part of the Note
provides an overview of cases on both sides of the issue of disclosure
by ISPs, focusing on the various means through which the courts have
implicated the First Amendment in their decisions.
A. The Cases for Compelled Disclosure
For some commentators, the debate over when ISPs should be
compelled to disclose the identities of anonymous posters highlights
an important inconsistency: "Why should anonymous Internet posters
be immune from liability for defamation or other torts when the
posters would be held liable if they attached their names to their
statements?""' 8 In what is considered the first reported instance of an
113. Matt Gallaway, Free Speech Impeded Online: The Courts are Beginning to
Define the Scope of Free Speech on the Web, Business 2.0, at
http://www.business2.com/articlesveb/0,1650,9619,FF.html (Mar. 6,2001).
114. Lidsky, supra note 59, at 887-88.
115. Id. at 888.
116. Bruce P. Smith, Cybersmearing and the Problem of Anonymous Online
Speech, 18 Comm. Law. 3,7 (2000).
117. See infra Parts II.A, II.B.
118. Roger M. Rosen & Charles B. Rosenberg, Suing Anonymous Defendants for
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anonymous speaker challenging the disclosure of his identity in
court,"9 a California county court120 employed this line of reasoning
when it considered the subpoena by Xircom, Inc., a modem company,
of Yahoo! to reveal the identity of an online user who had authored
two anonymous and allegedly defamatory postings on a message
board maintained by Yahoo!. In finding that "there is no right to free
speech to defame,' 121 the court rejected the anonymous speaker's
argument that the subpoena was "only being filed to chill the speech
of John Doe and other individuals"'2 2 and that the disclosure would
amount to a violation of the speaker's free speech rights."
A Virginia court, facing a similar challenge to a subpoena of an ISP,
delineated a set of guidelines for determining whether disclosure of
the user's identity should be compelled. In In re Subpoena Duces
Tecum to America Online, Inc.,24 Anonymous Publicly Traded
Company ("APTC") subpoenaed AOL to compel the ISP to reveal
the identities of five anonymous posters of allegedly defamatory
material representations and confidential information regarding
APTC in an AOL chat room." AOL challenged the subpoena on the
ground that the anonymous speakers' First Amendment rights to
communicate anonymously over the Internet would be impaired if
AOL were forced to comply. 126 In framing the issue as whether a
state's interest in protecting citizens from potentially actionable
Internet communications is outweighed by the right to anonymous
speech online, the court applied a three-step test to ensure that those
who abused the right of anonymous Internet speech could not hide
"behind an illusory shield of purported First Amendment rights."'2 7
According to the court, a non-party ISP such as AOL would be
required to disclose the identity of anonymous posters when:
Internet Defamation: Plaintiffs Counsel Can Utilize Specific Procedures to Unmask
an Online Wrongdoer, 24 L.A. Law. 19, 20 (2001).
119. Rebecca Fairely Raney, Judge Rejects Online Critic's Efforts to Remain
Anonymous, at http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/99/06/cyber/articles/
15identity.html (June 1, 1999).
120. Motion to Quash, Xircom, Inc. v. Doe, No. Civ. 188724 (Calif. Super. Ct.
Ventura County complaint filed May 5, 1999).
121. Raney, supra note 119.
122. Id.
123. Although the subpoena was later thrown out on technical grounds, the court
indicated that it would "look favorably" upon a redrafted one, and the parties settled
the case before a subpoena was reissued. Carl S. Kaplan, Company Settles Suit
Against Online Critic, at http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/99/07/cyber/articles/
16xircom.html (July 16, 1999).
124. No. 40580, 2000 WL 1210372 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 2000), order rev'd on other
grounds, America Online Inc., v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377
(Va. 2001).
125. Id. at *1.
126. Id. at *2.
127. Id. at *6.
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(1) the court is satisfied by the pleadings or evidence supplied to that
court
(2) that the party requesting the subpoena has a legitimate, good
faith basis to contend that it may be the victim of conduct actionable
in the jurisdiction where suit was filed and
(3) the subpoenaed identity information is centrally needed to
advance that claim. 12
In ruling that the APTC's subpoena had met the above requirements,
the court held that the compelling state interest in protecting citizens
from the "potentially severe consequences" of actionable Internet
communications outweighed any "limited intrusion" on the First
Amendment rights of innocent anonymous posters.'"
In Hvide v. Does,30 Erik Hvide accused eight anonymous posters in
a Yahoo! financial chat room of making false and derogatory
statements that both defamed him and damaged his company's
reputation.1 31  AOL was also subpoenaed to release information
regarding one of the posters who had an AOL e-mail account."- In
ruling that subpoenas could issue in the case subject to the review of
the appellate court, the court rejected the argument that the
"democratic nature of Internet discussions is supported by the
convention of anonymity"' 33 and that the plaintiffs should amend their
complaint to include greater specificity of the persons being sued and
the allegedly defamatory statements, as well as prove actual, financial
damages." The court ruled that "an anonymous critic is not entitled
to any special privilege that would prevent or delay his unmasking in a
lawsuit just because his comments were posted on the Internet," and
thereby rejected the defendants' argument that special court rules
should apply in online cybersmear cases. 3
Apart from suits alleging cybersmears of corporations, individual
plaintiffs have also challenged the right of online users to remain
anonymous in defamation litigation. In Melvin v. Doe," Judge Joan
Melvin filed a defamation action against a number of anonymous
posters on an AOL site who had accused her of political lobbying. As
part of her discovery, Judge Melvin attempted to reveal the identity of
the site's publisher, an action contested by the anonymous posters
128. Id at *8.
129. Id.
130. Motion to Quash, Hvide v. Does, No. 99-22831 CA 01 (Fla. Cir. Ct. complaint
filed Sept. 30, 1999), cert. denied, 770 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
131. See Matthew S. Effland, Digital Age Defamation: Free Speech v. Freedom
from Responsibility on the Internet, 75 Fla. BJ. 63, 63 (2001).
132. Id.
133. ACLU Brief, supra note 56, at 6.
134. Id. at 1.
135. See Walker, supra note 55, at 10 & n.2.
136. 49 Pa. D. & CAth 449 (Common Pleas Ct. of Allegheny County 2000).
2002] 2763
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
who fought to maintain their anonymity under the First Amendment.
Although in this instance discovery was directed to the anonymous
posters directly, the court found that "[iut is likely that the identity of
the publisher [could] be learned through discovery directed to
America Online, Inc."'13 7 In rejecting the defendants' argument that
their speech should be labeled "political" and remain anonymous
under the First Amendment, the court ruled that if the statements
were false, they would no longer be protected. 18 The court went on to
find that the plaintiff's request had met the court's threshold test for
allowing discovery- "that the complaint on its face set forth a valid
cause of action and that the plaintiff offer testimony that will permit a
jury to award damages." 13 9 The court agreed, however, with the
defendants that plaintiffs should not be allowed to "use the rules of
discovery to obtain the identity of an anonymous publisher simply by
filing a complaint that may, on its face, be without merit."14
In assessing the various arguments that have been raised by both
plaintiffs and the courts in online defamation actions, many
commentators have stressed the need to implement guidelines that
"place[] at least as great an emphasis on accountability and the
important interest in reputation that defamation law seeks to protect
as [they] place on the right to communicate anonymously., 41 These
commentators ask why a statement that would be actionable as libel in
a traditionally "nonanonymous" medium such as a newspaper or
magazine should be immunized when posted on the Internet. 142 In
addition, it has been acknowledged that unlike traditional forms of
print communications, the "extraordinary capacity of the Internet to
replicate almost endlessly any defamatory message lends credence to
the notion that 'the truth rarely catches up with a lie."'1 43 Even in
those instances where a message is posted on a bulletin board or in a
chat room frequented by only a few people, the technological
capabilities of the Internet allow for the unlimited republication of the
message in new forums.'" Unlike the fleeting spoken statements of
"street corner harangues," communications made over the Internet
may be far more lasting, because statements can be printed,
137. Id. at 450 n.l.
138. Id. at 455.
139. Id. at 462. In a separate memorandum and order of court, the defendants'
motion for summary judgment was denied after the plaintiff produced evidence that
would support a finding that the statement was made and was both false and
defamatory, and that the plaintiff had sustained actionable harm. The defendants did
not raise the argument that their statement was not defamatory. See id. at 452.
140. Id. at 451 n.2.
141. Rosen & Rosenberg, supra note 118, at 20.
142. See id.
143. Lidsky, supra note 59, at 864 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 344 n.9 (1974)).
144. See id.
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downloaded, or left on a Web site indefinitely)4. 5 In addition to the
Internet's potential for unprecedented information dissemination, it
also provides an exceedingly "low barrier" to speakers wishing to
communicate online.1" The Internet is easily accessible to anyone
with a computer and Internet connection, and unlike traditional forms
of print media, the communications of online speakers are generally
not subjected to any kind of editorial or "filtering" device." Finally,
most anonymous message board and chat room visitors are able to
find a responsive audience for their messages, unlike a "zealot" on a
public street corner who "is likely to be met with titters or nervous
glances."1"
Commentators have also noted that, although in many cases the
battle between the anonymous poster and potential plaintiff is framed
as one pitting the little, helpless individual, David, against the
powerful, greedy corporate, Goliath, "the reality is that sometimes the
little guy is being a jerk."'49 In commenting on the Xircom case, Mark
Gibbs argued that although many critics have characterized Xircom's
attempts to obtain the anonymous poster's identity as an example of
"the big bad company [that] is trying to shut down a whistleblower,"
in reality the corporation is attempting to seek redress from a critic
who claims to have been employed by Xircom and has staged an
attack on the company's management and products, an effort Gibbs
finds not "unreasonable.""15  Although Xircom's legal counsel has
stated that the messages of the anonymous poster, if truly an
employee of Xircom, would be in violation of his employment
contract, Gibbs asserts that instead of acknowledging Xircom's
interest in justice, "the Internet community and the press seem to be
happy not knowing the facts; they automatically side with the little
guy and worry about free speech and the squelching of
whistleblowers."1 5
Despite the force of arguments compelling disclosure, other courts
have been persuaded by arguments in favor of protecting anonymous
Internet speech, as the next section details.
B. The Cases Preserving Anonymous Speech
While many commentators have applauded the decisions of courts
unmasking the identities of anonymous online speakers, First
Amendment activists have advocated just as strongly for greater




149. Mark Gibbs, Responsible Anonymity and John Doe, Network World, June 28,





protection of anonymous free speech on the Internet. Those taking
this position have triumphed in several cases dealing with online
defamation or other related issues. In Columbia Insurance Co. v.
Seescandy.com, 152 the assignee of the federally registered service and
trademarks "SEE'S" and "SEE'S CANDIES" brought an action for,
inter alia, trademark infringement and dilution against, inter alia,
various individuals who registered the domain names
"seescandy.com" and "seecandys.com" under their Internet
pseudonyms or domain name registration identities. In
acknowledging the "legitimate and valuable right to participate in
online forums anonymously and pseudoanonymously," the court
recognized that "[p]eople who have committed no wrong should be
able to participate online without fear that someone who wishes to
harass or embarrass them can file a frivolous lawsuit and thereby gain
the power of the court's order to discover their identity.' ' 53 In striving
to balance this right against the right of plaintiffs to seek redress of
their grievances, the court outlined four principles to apply to
discovery requests seeking the identity of anonymous defendants:
First, the plaintiff should identify the missing party with sufficient
specificity such that the Court can determine that defendant is a real
person or entity who could be sued in federal court....
Second, the party should identify all previous steps taken to
locate the elusive defendant....
Third, the plaintiff should establish to the Court's satisfaction that
plaintiffs suit against defendant could withstand a motion to
dismiss....
Lastly, the plaintiff should file a request for discovery with the
Court, along with a statement of reasons justifying the specific
discovery requested as well as identification of a limited number of
persons or entities on whom discovery process might be served and
for which there is a reasonable likelihood that the discovery process
will lead to identifying information about defendant that would
make service of process possible.1 54
The court reasoned that employing such guidelines to determine when
the identities of anonymous defendants should be revealed would help
"foster open communication and robust debate" online, and would
allow people to interact anonymously and pseudoanonymously
without fear of embarrassing themselves by seeking information
"relevant to a sensitive or intimate condition."'55 In 2TheMart.com,5 6
152. 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
153. Id. at 578.
154. Id. at 578-80.
155. Id. at 578.
156. Doe v. 2TheMart.com, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2001); see
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the court considered the Seescandy.com court's reasoning in
formulating its own guidelines to apply in a discovery request, finding
that only an "exceptional case" would justify jeopardizing the First
Amendment rights of a non-party anonymous speaker.""-
Although both 2TheMart.corn and Seescandy.corn have been hailed
as integral cases protecting the right of defendants to remain
anonymous online, Dendrite International, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3,1'- in
which the court directly confronted the issue of when an ISP should
be compelled to honor a subpoena seeking the identity of an
anonymous Internet speaker in an online defamation action, has
emerged as the central case protecting the First Amendment right to
anonymous speech on the Internet. In Dendrite, anonymous poster
John Doe No. 3, under the screen name "xxplrr," posted nine
comments on a Yahoo! bulletin board concerning alleged changes in
the accounting practices at Dendrite and an attempt by the CEO to
sell the company.'59 In affirming the trial court's decision to deny the
plaintiff's discovery request to determine the identity of the
anonymous poster, the New Jersey Appellate Panel held that in
determining whether to compel an ISP to honor a subpoena, a court
"must consider and decide those applications by striking a balance
between the well-established First Amendment right to speak
anonymously, and the right of the plaintiff to protect its proprietary
interest and reputation through the assertion of recognizable claims
based on the actionable conduct of the anonymous... defendants."'"
The Dendrite court, relying on the guidelines delineated in
Seescandy.com, outlined a stringent test to be employed by courts
confronted with such subpoenas, and held that a trial court should
[F]irst require the plaintiff to undertake efforts to notify the
anonymous posters that they are the subject of a subpoena or
application for an order of disclosure, and withhold action to afford
the fictitiously-named defendants a reasonable opportunity to file
and serve opposition to the application. These notification efforts
should include posting a message of notification of the identity
discovery request to the anonymous user on the ISP's pertinent
message board.
[Second] [t]he court shall also require the plaintiff to identify and
set forth the exact statements purportedly made by each anonymous
poster that plaintiff alleges constitutes actionable speech.
[Third] [t]he complaint and all information provided to the court
should be carefully reviewed to determine whether plaintiff has set
supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
157. See 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1092-95.
158. 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
159. Id. at 763.
160. Id. at 760.
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forth a prima facie cause of action... [and] must produce sufficient
evidence supporting each element of its cause of action, on a prima
facie basis, prior to a court ordering the disclosure....
[If] the plaintiff has presented a prima facie cause of action, the
court must balance the defendant's First Amendment right of
anonymous free speech against the strength of the prima facie case
presented and the necessity for the disclosure of the anonymous
defendant's identity to allow the plaintiff to properly proceed. 161
The court stressed that these guidelines must be implemented on a
case-by-case basis to ensure that the result is "based on a meaningful
analysis and a proper balancing of the equities and rights at issue."1 62
The Dendrite court found that, although the plaintiff's defamation
claim could withstand a traditional motion to dismiss for failure to
state a cause of action, the claim should be reviewed under a stricter
level of scrutiny that comported with the guidelines outlined above.
The court ruled that in cases dealing with subpoenas seeking
compelled disclosure of anonymous speakers, the First Amendment
implications allowed courts to depart from traditional liberal
standards governing motions to dismiss because "application of our
motion-to-dismiss standard in isolation fails to provide a basis for an
analysis and balancing of Dendrite's request for disclosure in light of
[John Doe's] competing right of anonymity in the exercise of his right
of free speech."' 63  In examining Dendrite's claim to determine
whether it demonstrated the "harm" necessary to evidence a
defamatory statement,164 the court ruled that the allegations made by
Dendrite's vice president that the anonymous statements "may...
have a significant deleterious effect on Dendrite's ability to hire and
keep employees"165 and the company's contention that the postings
resulted in detrimental fluctuations in its stock prices, which the court
did not find reflected in its trading records, 166 were not enough to
prove the harm necessary to establish a prima facie defamation
claim. 167
161. Id. at 760-61.
162. Id. at 761.
163. Id. at 770.
164. See supra Part I.B.1.
165. Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 772.
166. The comments by xxplrr were posted on the bulletin board between March 14
and June 2, 2000. The trading records on the NASDAQ Exchange from March 1 to
June 15, 2000 showed that the total loss during the period was roughly 91 cents, with
gains on 32 days, losses on 40 days, and no changes on 2 days. In the seven days after
Doe No. 3 posted a statement about Dendrite, the net change in the company's stock
price represened an increase. Michael Bartlett, New Jersey Court Upholds Anonymity
on Net Bulletin Board, Newsbytes, at http://www.newsbytes.com (July 11, 2001).
167. Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 772. The trial judge relied upon the reasoning set forth
in McLaughlin v. Rosanio, Bailets & Talamo, Inc., 751 A.2d 1066 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2000).
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For many, Dendrite represents a seminal decision in the field of
anonymous Internet speech, one that struck an appropriate balance
between the rights of adversaries in Internet anonymous speech cases
and that is likely to become an "influential" decision for other trial
courts.' 6 Although concerns have been voiced that the decision may
"tip the balance too far" in favor of the First Amendment rights of
anonymous speakers, others have characterized the decision as a
"fair" attempt at resolving a difficult legal challenge.169
Part III of this Note argues that the guidelines adopted by the New
Jersey Appellate Division in Dendrite appropriately safeguard the
First Amendment rights of anonymous speakers and should be
implemented by trial courts faced with subpoenas seeking the
compelled disclosure of the identity of anonymous Internet speakers.
In applying the Dendrite guidelines in future cases, however, Part III
argues that trial courts must remain acutely aware of the unique
aspects of the Internet in determining whether each aspect of the test
has been fulfilled.
III. ADOPTING THE DENDRITE TEST
An examination of the guidelines set forth in Dendrite reveals that
the court struck a proper balance between the interests of defamation
plaintiffs and valued First Amendment principles. By requiring
plaintiffs to notify anonymous speakers that they are the subject of a
subpoena or application for an order of disclosure, the Dendrite court
addressed an essential concern of many proponents of free speech on
the Internet: that ISPs have not "offer[ed] the type of zealous
protection to anonymous speakers" that traditional print publications
have provided."' In most instances, the ISPs realize that by
complying with subpoenas compelling disclosure they are exposing
themselves to little financial or social risk. As a rule, ISPs do not
depend on anonymous speech in the same way that newspapers have
traditionally relied upon confidential sources in their publications."'
Therefore, although customers who are unsatisfied with the privacy
provided by an ISP may react by bringing their business to another
commercial online provider, protecting anonymous speech is not
"crucial" to the existence of an ISP.' In fact, most ISPs make it clear
to customers from the outset of their membership that, under certain
circumstances, the ISP will reveal the true identity behind a screen
168. Bartlett, supra note 166.
169. See id.
170. See Hilden, supra note 6.
171. See id.
172. See id. (acknowledging that although ISPs may lose customers who desire
greater protection of their privacy, preserving anonymous speech is not -crucial" to
the ISP "in the way protecting confidential sources is crucial to the very life (and
pride, and self-conception) of a newspaper").
2769
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
name.1 73 Furthermore, in many instances, an ISP may feel that it is in
its best interest to comply with a subpoena in order to avoid giving the
impression that it endorses speech that it finds "loathsome, false or
useless,"174 and may view the user who posts the potentially
defamatory material as a nuisance rather than a valuable customer. 75
In such cases, the ISP is unlikely to challenge the subpoena on its own
accord, thus making it vital for the anonymous speaker to have the
opportunity to challenge the impending disclosure of his identity.
Aside from allowing anonymous speakers the opportunity to
challenge the subpoena, granting notice may also enable the parties to
avoid pursuing unnecessary legal action. As free speech advocate
Mike Godwin has observed, "the preferred response [under the First
Amendment] to a defamation problem is to fix it yourself," and a
major goal of libel law has been "level[ing] the playing field" for
private individuals who have been libeled by the media and do not
have access to an outlet powerful enough to counteract the resultant
reputational damage.1 76 This theory breaks down within the context
of the Internet however, as the "low barrier" to speaking online
allows those who allegedly have been defamed the ability to respond
to the statements within the same medium and, in the case of many
bulletin boards and chat rooms, the exact same context in which the
original messages were posted." Often, this provides plaintiffs with a
means of redressing reputational damage that is "a lot more
satisfying" than seeking legal redress, and provides a remedy in "only
minutes."178
Giving defendants notice of potential legal action may also result in
behavior that placates the plaintiff without revealing the defendant's
173. The AOL Member Privacy Agreement includes the following statement: "We
will release specific information about your account only to comply with valid legal
process such as a search warrant, subpoena or court order, or in special cases such as a
physical threat to you or others." AOL Service Terms, at http://legal.web.aol.coml
policy/aolpol/privpol.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2002). Before responding to a
subpoena, ISPs are not now required to provide notice to an anonymous speaker that
his or her identity is going to be revealed. Although some ISPs may contact the user
as a matter of policy, others will not, denying the anonymous users the opportunity to
file a motion to quash the subpoena. If an ISP chooses to comply with the subpoena,
courts are usually not given the opportunity to determine whether the plaintiff's
complaint is facially sufficient, resulting in the anonymous user's identity being
compromised even in frivolous actions. See ACLU Brief, supra note 56, at 7.
174. Hilden, supra note 6.
175. Id.
176. Mike Godwin, Cyber Rights: Defending Free Speech in the Digital Age 81-82
(1998).
177. See ACLU Brief, supra note 56, at 4 ("A bulletin board user can promptly
post a reply to an objectionable posting and, in many (though by no means all) cases,
the reply will reach the exact audience that read the initial posting.").
178. Godwin, supra note 176, at 100; see also ACLU Brief, supra note 56, at 7
("The existence of an immediate right to reply to any defamatory statements suggests
courts should exercise caution in evaluating a plaintiff's unsupported allegations that
a defamatory posting caused him harm.").
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identity. In some instances, warning defendants may encourage them
to cease their allegedly defamatory anonymous postings in order to
avoid the revelation of their identities. In past cybersmear cases,
plaintiffs have also been willing to dismiss litigation in exchange for a
number of remedies, including public apologies or retraction
statements on the same boards as the original statements appeared, or
the payment of damages or attorney's fees.' Such means of redress
could often be enacted without the additional step of demanding that
an ISP disclose the true identity of the anonymous speaker.
Under the second guideline established by Dendrite, plaintiffs are
required to identify and set forth the precise statements that they
allege are defamatory. In general, this requirement will not serve as
an obstacle to pursuing an online defamation action. A review of pre-
Dendrite Internet speech litigation makes it clear, however, that this
requirement will go far to protect the First Amendment rights of
Internet speakers. For example, in Hvide,180 a major argument raised
by the ACLU revolved around its contention that the plaintiff had
failed to specify the bulletin board on which the allegedly anonymous
postings were made, or any "single specific statement uttered by a
single person." '181 By merely asserting in a "conclusory fashion" that a
number of defamatory statements had been posted without linking
them to any screen name or individual, the ambiguous nature of the
complaint rendered it impossible for any poster to determine whether
he or she would later be named as a defendant, or whether a defense
of truth or opinion could be asserted to defend an allegedly
defamatory statement.1 2 In effect, failing to set forth the defamatory
statements with specificity, similar to neglecting to give a poster notice
that there is a pending threat to his anonymity, results in anonymous
users being deprived of the right to challenge the subpoenas before
their First Amendment rights are jeopardized.
The Dendrite court addressed one of the overriding concerns
expressed by many commentators assessing the current wave of
cybersmear cases-that lawsuits are being brought by both private
individuals and corporations in an effort to determine the true identity
of the anonymous speakers and enact their own extra-judical
remedies. The court would require a plaintiff to set forth a prima facie
cause of action with sufficient evidence to support each element of the
defamation claim against the anonymous defendants before allowing
their identities to be revealed. In Raytheon v. Does 1-21, Raytheon
179. Jay Eisenhofer & Sidney S. Liebesman, Caught by the Net: What to do if a
Message Board Messes With Your Client, 10 Bus. L. Today, SeptJOct. 2000, at 40,46.
180. See supra notes 130-35 and accompanying text.
181. ACLU Brief, supra note 56, at 2.
182. Id.
183. Motion to Quash, Raytheon v. Does 1-21, No. 99-816 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Middlesex County complaint filed Feb. 1, 1999).
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Co. sued twenty-one anonymous posters, alleging that their postings
on a Yahoo! message board revealed confidential information about
rumored mergers and acquisitions, divestitures, and defense contracts.
After learning the identities of the posters by subpoenaing numerous
ISPs, Raytheon dropped the suit against the defendants, many of
whom turned out to be employees of the company who then quit their
jobs or were sent for "corporate counseling." 114  Unfortunately,
Raytheon is just one example in a troubling line of cases in which
corporations bring subpoenas to learn the identities of the anonymous
posters, but then choose to forego judicial remedies'15 in favor of
implementing their own means of "quiet[ing] criticism. ' 186  In
requiring trial courts to examine a plaintiffs complaint under a level
of scrutiny stricter than that of a motion to dismiss, the guidelines in
Dendrite will help to alleviate this problem by encouraging only those
plaintiffs confident that they can evidence each element of a
defamation claim to file a subpoena.
In determining whether a defamation claim has been adequately
established, the Dendrite appellate court also looked to whether the
plaintiff had suffered any harm from the allegedly defamatory
statements, and noted that the trial court had refused to link opinions
on an Internet message board to the subsequent drop in Dendrite's
stock price without something more concrete than the claims of
Dendrite's vice president and the company's inconclusive trading
records."8 The ACLU has argued that because the "actual malice"
standard may not provide adequate "breathing space" to protect
Internet defendants who may not be able to prove, as would a
traditional media defendant, the process they undertook in verifying
the credibility of their sources of information, requiring the plaintiff to
prove special, or monetary, damages would help prevent "chilling"
184. Raney, supra note 119.
185. See Firm Ends 'John Doe' Lawsuit After Learning Identities, 6.08 EPIC
ALERT (EPIC), at http://www.epic.org/alert/EPICAlert6.08.html (June 1, 1999)
("The outcome of the Raytheon case is troubling because it suggests that judicial
discovery procedures can be used to destroy an individual's anonymity without any
determination of the validity of the underlying legal claim [and] ... a resulting chilling
effect on anonymous Internet speech.").
186. Joshua R. Furman, Cybersmear or Cyber-SLAPP: Analyzing Defamation
Suits Against Online John Does as Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 25
Seattle U. L. Rev. 213, 218 (2001).
187. Critics have argued, however, that the standard for evaluating claims under
Dendrite grants too much deference to anonymous speech and will deter even merit-
based claims. Instead, these critics have advocated a more relaxed approach under
which "a court would ask whether the communications as alleged in a complaint could
reasonably be found to be actionable if false. If so, and after a hearing on the matter,
the plaintiff would be entitled to learn the identity of the speaker." Rosen &
Rosenberg, supra note 118, at 21. It is unlikely however that such an approach will
prevent the kind of meritless claims against which critics of Raytheon have warned.
188. Dendrite Intern., Inc. v. Doe, No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 772 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2001).
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anonymous speakers into silence.'18 Even if plaintiffs are not required
to prove pecuniary loss, however, it is imperative that courts do not
allow plaintiffs such as Dendrite to proceed on mere allegations that
anonymous statements caused them harm, as this would result in an
unrestrained means through which plaintiffs could obtain the
identities of anonymous speakers.
Finally, the Dendrite court held that even after a plaintiff has
presented a prima facie cause of action, the court must still balance
the speaker's First Amendment right to anonymous speech against the
strength of the plaintiff's case, as well as the necessity of the disclosure
in allowing the plaintiff to proceed properly. In its amicus curie brief
to the Dendrite court, Public Citizen'" argued that
the final factor to consider in balancing the need for confidentiality
versus discovery is the strength of the movant's case.... If the case
is weak, then little purpose will be served by allowing such
discovery, yet great harm will be done by revelation of privileged
information. In fact, there is a danger in such a case that it was
brought just to obtain the names.... On the other hand, if a case is
strong and the information sought goes to the heart of it and is not
available from other sources, then the balance may swing in favor of
discovery if the harm from such discovery is not too severe"I
The need for courts to "balance the equities" by demanding only
"necessary" disclosures that "go[o to the heart" of the plaintiff's case
takes on an even greater importance in cases of anonymous Internet
speech, in which individuals are able "to reach other members of the
public who are hundreds or even thousands of miles away, at virtually
no cost," while avoiding the "retaliation" that could stem from
disclosure of their identities."9  In their brief in Dendrite, Public
Citizen and the ACLU of New Jersey stressed that a defendant's
anonymity could easily be breached by corporations and private
plaintiffs seeking to chill the defendant's speech by hauling him into
court for costly and exhaustive litigation. -19 3  Aside from silencing
critics with the threat of litigation, courts also must acknowledge the
risk inherent in those cases where a plaintiff's complaint fulfills the
elements of a defamation action, but the plaintiff is nonetheless
189. ACLU Brief, supra note 56, at 13-14 (citing George W. Pring & Penelope
Canan, SLAPPs: Getting Sued for Speaking Out 1-2, 217 (1996)) (arguing that the
practical effect of allowing presumed damages in defamation cases -is to make it easy
for a plaintiff to sue for defamation any time he comes in for harsh criticism").
190. Public Citizen is a non-profit, national consumer advocacy organization that
represents consumer rights in all three branches of government. For more
information on Public Citizen's role in Dendrite, see http'J/www.publiccitizen.org.
191. Brief of Amici Curie, Public Citizen & ACLU of New Jersey at 19, Dendrite
Int'l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (No. A-2774-00)
(quoting Missouri ex reL Classic III v. Ely, 954 S.W.2d 650,659 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997)).
192. Id. at 11.
193. See i. at 17.
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seeking the identity of the defendants in an effort to enact an extra-
judicial remedy. By taking the interests of both sides into account
after finding a prima facie case, courts will at least acknowledge the
need of keeping "the lines of Internet communication open while not
encouraging posters to use anonymity to abuse the rights of others."'94
It is also imperative that courts learn to view libel allegations within
the unique context of the Internet. In determining whether a
plaintiff's complaint includes a published 95 "false and defamatory
statement concerning another,' 19 6 commentators have argued that the
defamatory import of the communication must be viewed in light of
the fact that bulletin boards and chat rooms "are often the repository
of a wide range of casual, emotive, and imprecise speech," and that
the online "recipients of [offensive] statements do not necessarily
attribute the same level of credence to the statements [that] they
would accord to statements made in other contexts." 9 Because the
context of a statement impacts its potentially defamatory import, 98 it
is necessary to view allegedly defamatory statements published on the
Internet within the broader framework on which they appear, taking
into account both the tenor of the chat room or message board in
which they are posted, and the language of the statements.19 9 The low
barrier to speaking online allows anyone with an Internet connection
to publish his thoughts, free from the editorial constraints that serve
as gatekeepers for most traditional media of disseminating
information.2" Often, this results in speech characterized by
194. Id. at 20.
195. In most cases, the issue of whether a statement has been published on the
Internet will not be called into question, as defamatory statements become actionable
as soon as they have been communicated to a third person. See Schwartz et al., supra
note 2, at 861. It has been argued, however, that "keying defamatory content in
preparation for transmission of an e-mail message or posting on a discussion group
that has not been viewed by others should not be characterized as a publication until
the message has in fact been transmitted or posted and read by another." Schachter,
supra note 3, at 196.
196. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558 (1977).
197. Schachter, supra note 3, at 244. "Rigid application of libel laws to comments
made in such an environment might well impose a 'burden of constant vigilance that
greatly exceeds the benefits to be had."' Id. (quoting Tacket v. General Motors Corp.,
836 F.2d 1042, 1046 (7th Cir. 1987)).
198. See id. at 243.
199. See ACLU Brief, supra note 56, at 4. "Discourse on financial message boards,
for example, tends to resemble informal spoken conversation more than it does
formal written communications, and anyone who regularly frequents the message
boards learns to interpret what is posted accordingly." Id.
200. Roundtable, First Amendment, supra note 62, at 860 ("[Ilf the Internet
continues as it appears to be moving, everyone.., will have an opportunity to be a
reporter. But nobody will be an editor. And that will have profound consequences
for the quality of the discourse, the quality of the information, and potentially, for
legal liability.").
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grammatical and spelling errors, the use of slang, and, in many
instances, an overall lack of coherence."1
As the interest that defamation seeks to protect is reputational, in
order to be defamatory a statement must "diminish the respect, good
will, confidence or esteem in which [the plaintiff] is held, or... excite
adverse or unpleasant feelings about him."202 In most instances, it
seems unlikely that a message including the slang and grammatical
errors found in many bulletin board postings would have this effect.
In addition, an allegedly defamatory communication must be "read
and construed in the sense in which the readers to whom it is
addressed would ordinarily understand it. So the whole item...
should be read and construed together, and its meaning and
signification thus determined." 3 In light of these principles, it seems
unrealistic to assume that a plaintiff will suffer the same damage to his
reputation on a common ISP bulletin board as he would in a more
traditional publication that is subject to a stringent level of editorial
control, as most readers will realize that many of the postings on the
board are not meant to be taken seriously. In an effort to preserve the
"democratic nature of discussion on the Internet" that has allowed the
medium to emerge as the vessel that will "transform the First
Amendment 'marketplace of ideas' from ideal to reality," courts must
address this assumption and accept that "inevitably," discourse over
the Internet will be "more lively and free wheeling than discussions in
the mainstream media, simply by virtue of the fact they include more
participants and more perspectives. ' '21 The defamatory import of
speech cannot be divorced from the context in which it occurs.
Therefore, it is necessary for courts to acknowledge and embrace the
fact that the unique technological characteristics of the Internet have
allowed it to develop into an unprecedented forum for "uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open"2 '5 speech.
CONCLUSION
With the increasing popularity of the Internet, society has witnessed
an unprecedented revolution in the means through which information
may be disseminated. Although contributing to the "robust" and
"democratic" nature of speech on the Internet, bulletin boards in
201. In 2TheMarconz, the court provided examples of the statements that had
been posted on the TMRT site, including: "'[management was] dumped by their
accountants... these guys are friggin liars.., why haven't they told the public this
yet??? Liars and criminals!!!!'." and ."Lying, cheating, thieving, stealing, lowlife
criminals!!!!"' Doe v. 2TheMart.com, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (W.D. Wash.
2001).
202. Schwartz et al., supra note 2, at 838.
203. Wash. Post Co. v. Chaloner, 250 U.S. 290, 293 (1919) (quoting Commercial
Pub'Ig. Co. v. Smith 149 F. 704,706 (W.D. Tenn. 1907)).
204. ACLU Brief, supra note 56, at 6.
205. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,270 (1964).
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which participants can speak anonymously or pseudoanonymously
through the use of a screen name have also given rise to their fair
share of problems in the area of online defamation. To some degree,
nearly all of the courts that have adjudicated cases of subpoenas
compelling ISPs to disclose the identities of speakers have recognized
the need to balance the right of the plaintiff to redress of his injury
against that of the defendant to speak anonymously. In Dendrite,
however, the New Jersey Appellate Division developed a set of
guidelines that most succinctly sets forth the individual steps the
courts must take to protect defendants' First Amendment right to
anonymous free speech. By uniformly applying these guidelines in
ISP subpoena cases, while remaining cognizant of the unique
characteristics of the Internet, trial courts will ensure that the naming
of online John Does will occur only when adequate notice has been
given to the defendants and the identity is necessary to further a
plaintiff's legitimate claim, and thereby will allow the plaintiff a means
of redress while safeguarding a cherished First Amendment right.
